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Op-Ed – Dual-Use Research: Is it possible to protect the public without encroaching rights?
T. Tosin Fadeyi, Master’s Candidate, Biotechnology (Biodefense and Biosecurity Concentration), University of Maryland Read More »
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Book Review: Bioinsecurity and Vulnerability
Reviewed by T. Tosin Fadeyi Edited by Nancy N. Chen and Lesley A. Read More »
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Op-Ed – Microbial Forensic Attribution: Where Science Meets International Relations
Christopher A. Bidwell, JD, Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy, Federation of American Read More »
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Op-Ed – Science Needs for Microbial Forensics: Developing Initial International Research Priorities
Committee on Science Needs Microbial Forensics: Developing an Initial International Roadmap, Board on Read More »
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Op-Ed – A Necessary Biopreparedness Priority: Strengthening the Medical Countermeasures Enterprise
Christina England, Master’s Candidate, Security Policy, University of Maryland School of Public Policy; Read More »
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Where Should We Keep Smallpox Virus?
To the Editors:
In a recent issue of Biosecurity and Bioterrorism (March 2011), Tucker discussed partial retention of smallpox virus stock for continuation of smallpox research at 2 laboratories, 1 in the U.S. and 1 in Russia. A recent editorial in Nature (January 20, 2011) supported his opinion, saying ‘‘smallpox is a disease of history, but it cannot be consigned to the past.’’ I worked for the WHO smallpox eradication program for many years, including during the disposal of smallpox virus stocks in the last phase and posteradication. While I agree with the retention of the virus for research, I feel that retaining the virus at a UN/WHO facility would be better, as I have already briefly suggested in my book Smallpox Eradication Saga (2010). I would like to give the rationale for my point: Why have a UN/WHO facility for retention? And what research is needed?
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