Ten Years after 9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks: Protecting Against Biological Threats

Testimony of Thomas Inglesby, MD, Director, Center for Biosecurity of UPMC before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, October 18, 2011
Conclusions: The country has made steady progress in the last decade, but there is much more that needs to be done to make us resilient to biological threats. There is vitally important work to do in countermeasure development, public health preparedness, biosurveillance and other key issues in the years ahead. We hope that the coming reauthorization of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act will address many of the issues that I have outlined today. Thank you for this opportunity to provide recommendations in each of these areas.

Author:
Thomas Inglesby
Publish Date:
October 18, 2011

Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impac

The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons…

Author:
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Publish Date:
Updated December 2004

Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context

Current popular attention being paid to the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) use by terrorists may give the impression that this is a new phenomenon, but it is not. Most chemical and biological weapons themselves have a long history: the first chemical weapons were used in ancient Greece; biological weapons have been used in a wartime context since at least the Middle Ages.1Employed extensively in the first World War, notably in the use of mustard gas,chemical weapons have evolved very little in their technology since the midtwentieth century. Although recent technological advances in biological weapon shave been made, the vaccines and treatments available to deal with some of them have also advanced. Historically, most terrorist groups have avoided using CBW, inpart because they do not want to alienate their own constituencies, and in part because they have not had the technical expertise to turn them into effective weapons.2 Those CBW attacks that have occurred represent a small proportion of the total number of international terrorist incidents.3 CBW weapons have rarely been used by subnational groups…

Author:
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Publish Date:
March 2003

Test and Evaluation of Biological Standoff Detection Systems: Abbreviated Version

In a request from the office of the Product Director for Test Equipment, Strategy, and Support (PD TESS) of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense in the Department of Defense (DOD), The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was asked to provide a report assessing the current and future needs for testing and evaluating biological standoff detection systems, the current test and evaluation (T&E) capabilities and to provide guidance on how to meet the future needs of this T&E mission.

Author:
U.S. National Academy of Sciences
Publish Date:
August 2008

The U.S. Role in Global Polio Eradication

This paper provides an overview of the global polio eradication effort, emphasizing the U.S. role. The purpose is to explain how the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) came to where it is today and discuss plans for moving it forward. The focus on the United States is not meant to detract from the enormous international investments or essential contributions of individuals from other countries. But by highlighting American involvement, the paper aims to help U.S. policymakers understand the costs, benefits, and challenges of polio eradication and plans to complete eradication and transition GPEI methods and resources into other programs.

Author:
Nellie Bristol, CSIS
Publish Date:
Dec 17 2012