Ready or Not? Protecting the Public from Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism finds key programs that detect and respond to bioterrorism, new disease outbreaks and natural or accidental disasters are at risk due to federal and state budget cuts. The report, supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), identifies some key programs at risk due to continued cuts to federal public health emergency preparedness funds include:
51 of the 72 cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative are at risk for elimination; the Initiative supports the ability to rapidly distribute and administer vaccines and medications during emergencies;
All 10 state labs with “Level 1” chemical testing status are at risk for losing top level capabilities, which could leave the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the only public health lab in the country with full ability to test for chemical terrorism and accidents;
24 states are at risk for losing the support of Career Epidemiology Field Officers – CDC experts who supplement state and local gaps to rapidly prevent and respond to outbreaks and disasters, such as during the H1N1 flu pandemic and responding to the health impact of the Gulf Oil Spill in 2010; and
The ability for CDC to mount a comprehensive response to nuclear, radiologic and chemical threats as well as natural disasters is at risk due to potential cuts to the National Center for Environmental Health. All 50 states and Washington, D.C. would lose the support CDC provides during these emergencies.
“We’re seeing a decade’s worth of progress eroding in front of our eyes,” said Jeff Levi, PhD, Executive Director of TFAH. “Preparedness had been on an upward trajectory, but now some of the most elementary capabilities – including the ability to identify and contain outbreaks, provide vaccines and medications during emergencies, and treat people during mass traumas – are experiencing cuts in every state across the country.”
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Ready or Not? Protecting the Public from Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism
- December 21, 2011
- | Filed under North America, Report, and 2001-2025
Regional and National Biosafety and Biosecurity Strategies for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
More than 100 participants from around the world convened in Abu Dhabi, UAE from 12-14 November 2007 for Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference 2007 (BBIC 2007): A Seminar for the Life Sciences and Policy Communities in the Gulf and MENA Region. Conference participants explored biosafety, biosecurity, environmental health and infectious disease issues specific to the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA1) and interacted with experts from other parts of the world.
In order to carry out these recommendations, a core group of participants worked together to agree an action plan to carry out the conference outcomes, including the development of a framework for a regional biosafety and biosecurity strategy, and to begin planning BBIC 2009, hosted in Casablanca, Morocco from April 2-4, 2009. The framework served as the basis for discussion and was the particular focus of breakout sessions on the four proposed working groups. As a result of those discussions, some amendments to the framework were suggested and the conference adopted the amended framework by acclamation.
Prepared by: ICLS with the assistance of a core group of experts from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
- April 4, 2011
- | Filed under Africa, Middle East, Report, and 2001-2025
Regional Approaches to Hospital Preparedness
This article describes issues related to the engagement of hospitals and other community partners in a coordinated regional healthcare preparedness and response effort. The report is based on interviews with public health and hospital representatives from 13 regions or states across the country. It aims to identify key ingredients for building successful regional partnerships for healthcare preparedness as well as critical challenges and policy and practical recommendations for their development and sustainability.
- February 21, 2012
- | Filed under North America, Other, and 2001-2025
Regulating Biorisks: Developing A Coherent Policy Logic (Part II)
This is the second of two articles that empirically details the working practices of regulators charged with overseeing biological research. The first article considered how regulators from the Biological Agents Unit of the UK Health and Safety Executive went about implementing the British legislation controlling work with biological agents and genetically modified organisms prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing anthrax letters in the U.S. This second article continues the investigation of the Biological Agents Unit’s working practices by considering how its activities have changed and adapted to the new, post-9/11 policy and regulatory environment. The main argument put forward in the articles is that an understanding of the implementation processes—that is, the strategies adopted by regulatory agencies and the styles employed by agency regulators in their interactions with those regulated—is critical to developing a coherent policy logic for the emerging regulatory regime around biorisks.
- February 21, 2012
- | Filed under Europe, North America, Other, and 2001-2025
Remarks at the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference
“Thank you, Mr. President. And I would also like to express my appreciation to all of the delegates and to my colleague, Minister Rosenthal, for his comments. I want to thank the Implementation Support Unit for all the efforts to advance the work here.
I want to start by acknowledging that our countries have accomplished a great deal together under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. One hundred sixty-five states have now committed not to pursue these weapons, and I am delighted to welcome Burundi and Mozambique to the Convention, and I join in urging all states who have not yet done so to join.
President Obama has made it a top goal of his Administration to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, because we view the risk of a bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority. In an age when people and diseases cross borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a transnational threat, and therefore we must protect against them with transnational action. …”
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