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A Peer-Review Mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Few issues are more sensitive than that of verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC). Since the collapse of the Protocol discussions in 2001, there has been much debate as to how—in the absence of agreement among states parties—to strengthen compliance with the BTWC regime. Two intersessional processes have generated valuable ideas on possible steps to increase confidence and compliance. One concrete measure that has been suggested is that of a peer-review mechanism.

While common in academia, the utility or application of peer review for a disarmament treaty is perhaps not evident at first glance. This study explores the potential application of a peer-review mechanism for the BTWC through an initial survey of five distinct peer-review mechanisms already in use in the international community. With a deeper understanding of the purpose, structure, and mechanisms of peer-review processes, disarmament practitioners will be in a better position to discuss whether peer review might be one step to strengthen the BTWC regime.

The study is based on a definition of peer review for international organizations published by the Legal Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD characterizes peer review as “the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles”.

Author:
James Revill, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Publish Date:
2012

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A Precarious “Hot Zone”–The President’s Plan to Combat Bioterrorism

SUMMARY — … With this most recent announcement, the President introduced Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62), which is to “create a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century” and to clarify the roles of agencies and departments to ensure a coordinated approach to planning for such terrorist induced emergencies. … With obviously no alternatives, and a vital need to match resources with programmatic goals, the GAO was left to suggest that OMB itself carry out the entire crosscutting, coordination function. … Again, there is a “grab-bag” of solutions, under-funded, nestled in the most significant of legislation passed to date on the bioterrorism threat.   Read More »

Author:
Texas Tech University
Publish Date:
2000

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ABSA Biosecurity Task Force White Paper: Understanding Biosecurity

“Over the past decade questions have arisen regarding the adequacy of security at biomedical institutes and facilities that work with, store, or transport pathogens and toxins. As an extremist demonstrated he could procure pathogens “for private use” by phone, and it is possible that an individual with access to a biological research facility may be the perpetrator of the recent anthrax letter attacks, legislation has been passed to increase security at facilities working with, storing or transporting pathogens and toxins…”

Author:
American Biological Safety Association (ABSA)
Publish Date:
January 2003

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Acting on the Lessons of SARS: What Remains to be Done?

“SARS caused great alarm in the public health and medical preparedness communities. Within 4 months, SARS was global, eventually infecting 8, 098 people in 29 countries in 6 continents and killing 774 of them. National and international guidance was issued, many health departments and hospitals created SARS plans, personal protective equipment was purchased, and healthcare workers were trained in respiratory precautions. In the months following the SARS pandemic, a number of conferences were held and reports issued on lessons learned from SARS. Now, from the vantage point of 8 years’ distance, what did we really learn? What are the remaining unanswered questions? What remains to be done?”
By Eric S. Toner and Jennifer B. Nuzzo

Author:
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
Publish Date:
2011

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Adaptations of Avian Flu Virus Are a Cause for Concern

Members of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza. We are in the midst of a revolutionary period in the life sciences. Technological capabilities have dramatically expanded, we have a much improved understanding of the complex biology of selected microorganisms, and we have a much improved ability to manipulate microbial genomes. With this has come unprecedented potential for better control of infectious diseases and significant societal benefit. However, there is also a growing risk that the same science will be deliberately misused and that the consequences could be catastrophic. Efforts to describe or define life-sciences research of particular concern have focused on the possibility that knowledge or products derived from such research, or new technologies, could be directly misapplied with a sufficiently broad scope to affect national or global security. Research that might greatly enhance the harm caused by microbial pathogens has been of special concern (1–3). Until now, these efforts have suffered from a lack of specificity and a paucity of concrete examples of “dual use research of concern” (3). Dual use is defined as research that could be used for good or bad purposes. We are now confronted by a potent, real-world example.

Author:
Kenneth I. Berns, Arturo Casadevall, Murray L. Cohen, Susan A. Ehrlich, Lynn W. Enquist, J. Patrick Fitch, David R. Franz, Claire M. Fraser-Liggett, Christine M. Grant, Michael J. Imperiale, Joseph Kanabrocki, Paul S. Keim, Stanley M. Lemon, Stuart B. Levy, John R. Lumpkin, Jeffery F. Miller, Randall Murch, Mark E. Nance, Michael T. Osterholm, David A. Relman, James A. Roth, Anne K. Vidaver
Publish Date:
January, 31 2012

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