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This document is a statement made by Paul N. Stockton to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on challenges within the Department of Homeland Security in responding to flaws made apparent by Hurricane Katrina and anticipating and preparing for what’s to come.
By Paul N. Stockton

DHS is proposing to move foot-and mouth disease (FMD) research from its current location at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center–located on a federally owned island off the northern tip of Long Island, New York–and potentially onto the United States mainland. FMD is the most highly infectious animal disease that is known. Nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected. A single outbreak of FMD on the U.S. mainland could have significant economic consequences. Concerns have been raised about moving FMD research off its island location and onto the U.S. mainland–where it would be in closer proximity to susceptible animal populations–as opposed to building a new facility on the island. GAO was asked to evaluate the evidence DHS used to support its decision that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland, whether an island location provides any additional protection over and above that provided by modern high containment laboratories on the mainland, and the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland. In preparing this testimony, GAO interviewed officials from DHS and USDA, talked with experts in FMD and high-containment laboratories worldwide, and reviewed studies on FMD, high-containment laboratories, and the economic consequences of FMD outbreaks. GAO also visited the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and other animal biocontainment laboratories in other countries.

In response to the global spread of emerging infectious diseases and the threat of bioterrorism, high-containment biosafety laboratories (BSL)–specifically biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4–have been proliferating in the United States. These labs–classified by the type of agents used and the risk posed to personnel, the environment, and the community–often contain the most dangerous infectious disease agents, such as Ebola, smallpox, and avian influenza. This testimony addresses (1) the extent to which there has been a proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs, (2) federal agencies’ responsibility for tracking this proliferation and determining the associated risks, and (3) the lessons that can be learned from recent incidents at three high-containment biosafety labs. To address these objectives, GAO asked 12 federal agencies involved with high-containment labs about their missions and whether they tracked the number of labs overall. GAO also reviewed documents from these agencies, such as pertinent legislation, regulation, and guidance. Finally, GAO interviewed academic experts in microbiological research.