Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat

In addition to meeting the continuing threat of new and reemerging infectious diseases, public health officials must also prepare for the possible use of infectious agents as weapons by terrorists to further personal or political agendas. These were the conclusions of session panelists Scott Lillibridge, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Michael Skeels, Oregon State Public Health Laboratory; Marcelle Layton, New York City Department of Public Health; David Franz, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; and Randall Murch, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Author:
Joseph E. McDade and David Franz
Publish Date:
September 1998

Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security

Congressional interest in the development of bioterrorism countermeasures remains strong, even after passage of legislation establishing Project BioShield.During the 109th Congress, several bills were introduced (although not enacted),including S. 3, the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act, S. 975, the Project Bioshield II Act, and S. 1873, the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and DrugDevelopment Act, that would have generated additional incentives for the creation of new technologies to counteract potential biological threats. These bills proposed reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property,particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products…

Author:
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Publish Date:
Updated November 2006

Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation – the Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National Security Federalism

SUMMARY — … However, the threat of biological attack–as distinct from chemical and nuclear attacks–has raised new concerns about our national security. … Preparation and surveillance are most critical to a threat of bioterrorism, and the only way to fulfill the Constitutional mandates is for the federal government to provide adequate national security. … Thus, bioterrorism has given rise to a new conflict with federalism where national security, the province of the federal government, becomes a matter of public health, an area traditionally regulated by the states. … But is there a legal mechanism to shift the long held powers of public safety from the states to the federal government in the case of bioterrorism? If each state elected to enact a uniform surveillance system which interfaces neatly with that of each and all of the other states, would this be sufficient to address the needs of a national security response and preclude the need for more invasive uses of federal powers into the area of public health? The specter of a national security threat led by 50 leaders with 50 different sets of priorities is not only foolish, but also a failure of the role of the federal government in the “continued existence” of the nation. …

Citation: Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation – the Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National Security Federalism, Georgetown Pub. Pol. Rev. 6:2 (Spring 2001). Lead article in a volume featuring bioterrorism. Analysis of the issues of federalism challenging the federal and state governments in the emerging threat of bioterrorism attacks in a domestic context and how best to legislate and regulate within a U.S. constitutional framework. Intent of the framers is examined in an analysis of this topic.

Author:
Texas Tech University
Publish Date:
2001

Breaking the Deadlock Over Destruction of the Smallpox Virus Stocks

One of the longest and most contentious policy debates in the field of international health has swirled around the fate of the last known stocks of variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, which are held in 2 World Health Organization (WHO)-authorized repositories in the United States and Russia. After a global campaign under WHO auspices eradicated smallpox in the late 1970s, it was expected that the remaining laboratory samples of variola virus would be destroyed. In the mid-1990s, however, the U.S. government, concerned that a few countries may have retained undeclared caches of the virus for biological warfare purposes, sought to delay destruction of the WHO-authorized stocks in order to develop improved medical countermeasures. In 1996 the U.S. persuaded the World Health Assembly, the annual policymaking meeting of WHO member states, to approve the temporary retention of live variola virus at the 2 authorized repositories for an ambitious program of defensive research. Although in 1999 and 2002 the World Health Assembly extended the smallpox research program for additional periods until specified goals had been achieved, today pressures are growing to set a new date for virus destruction.

Author:
Jonathan B. Tucker
Publish Date:
January 10, 2011

Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, in collaboration with the American Association of Universities (AAU) and Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU), have hosted meetings with the biological sciences community to summarize important lessons learned, challenges faced, and areas for improvement of local and national-level biosecurity initiatives.

Author:
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Publish Date:
Feb 2013