“The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed on April 10, 1972. The United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom deposited their instruments of Ratification of the Convention on March 26, 1975, and the Treaty came into force. It was the first—and for a long time only—post World War II disarmament treaty in which an entire class of weapons of mass destruction was done away with—or so it was widly assumed at the time—and the arms control community by and large thought biological warfare had been removed from the scene. Contrary to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT), there was to be no preferred group of countries that would continue to retain the weapons. Biological weapons were to be prohibited to all, into the future. This was the first major and unique distinction of the subject.”
By Milton Leitenberg
Browse By Region
Browse By Type
Browse By Date Range
Biological Weapons Arms Control: Project on Rethinking Arms Control
Bioresponse Report Card
The idea for this report card project began late last year, when we asked ourselves the question, “If the nation is unprepared for a biological attack, what more can we do?” Since 2001, the United States government has spent more than $65 billion on biodefense, and yet it has done so without an end-to-end, strategic assessment of the nation’s bioresponse capabilities. This report seeks to fill that gap.
- March 13, 2013
- | Filed under North America, Featured, Report, and 2001-2025
Biorisk Management: Laboratory biosecurity guidance
This present document aims to expand the laboratory biosecurity concepts introduced in LBM3, and to strike a balance between the long-known biosafety procedures and practices described in LBM3 and the more recently introduced and broader biosecurity concepts. It further introduces the overarching “biorisk management” approach that has resulted from careful thinking, comprehensive study of prevailing practices and recommendations, review of international norms and standards, and relevant ethical considerations Shortcomings currently observed in a number of settings are discussed, and practical solutions are proposed.
The document is intended for the use of relevant national regulatory authorities, laboratory directors (laboratory managers) and laboratory workers, all of whom play key roles in the field of biosciences and in public health in general.
- April 7, 2011
- | Filed under Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Middle East, North America, South America, South Asia, and Other
Biosafety and Biosecurity: Building Sustainable Capacity Conference Outcome Document
This document summarizes the outcomes of the 2nd Conference of the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), Biosafety and Biosecurity: Building Sustainable Capacity, held in Johannesburg, South Africa on 28 and 29 June, 2012. The conference sought to identify innovative approaches to biosafety and biosecurity that are affordable, practical and sustainable; to raise awareness and highlight the significant benefits of sound practices; to advocate strategies to collectively address urgent gaps and priorities in under‐addressed regions of the world; and, to facilitate collaboration among the African and international biosafety communities. The conference was co‐hosted by the African Biological Safety Association who have transformed the face of biosafety with the formation of several new national associations including in Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Kenya, Morocco, Egypt, Uganda and South Africa.
- August 8, 2012
- | Filed under Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Middle East, North America, South America, South Asia, Other, Report, and 2001-2025
Biosafety Laboratories – Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation’s Five BSL-4 Laboratories
Biosafety labs under the U.S. Bioterrorism Act are primarily regulated and must be registered with either the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Select Agent Regulations. Currently, all operational biosafety level (BSL) 4 labs are registered with the CDC and thus are regulated by the CDC, not USDA. BSL-4 labs handle the world’s most dangerous agents and diseases. In fact, of the four BSL designations, only BSL-4 labs can work with agents for which no cure or treatment exists. GAO was asked to perform a systematic security assessment of key perimeter security controls at the nation’s five operational BSL-4 labs. To meet this objective, GAO performed a physical security assessment of the perimeter of each lab using a security survey it developed. GAO focused primarily on 15 physical security controls, based on GAO expertise and research of commonly accepted physical security principles.
- March 12, 2012
- | Filed under North America, Report, and 2001-2025
